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ABSTRACT
This article examines Jacques Derrida’s concept of “messianicité sans 
messianisme” (“messianicity without messianism”) as an important 
example of rethinking the role and nature of religion in the late period 
of the work of the philosopher. Historical and philosophical analysis 
demonstrates that the appeal to the problem of messianism is inherent 
to many Jewish philosophers of the early twentieth century. They tried 
to develop a concept of time that would maintain full openness to the 
future and at the same time remember the past. Their work affected 
the interpretation of messianism in Derrida, because he developed his 
concept in discussion with Walter Benjamin and Emmanuel Lévinas. 
As the most general structure of the experience of justice, openness 
to the undecidable future, and respect for other messianicity do not 
exclude the religious manifestations of messianism, calling instead for 
the unceasing deconstruction of their fundamentalist claims.
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Introduction
The overall goal of this article is to examine the rethinking of religion in 
contemporary continental philosophy as illustrated by Jacques Derrida’s 
concept of messianicity, which, according to many scholars, was the most 
influential form of philosophical interpretation of messianism during the twentieth 
century. With this aim in mind, we will start exploring the resurgence of the ideas 
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of hope and the future in the works of the key Jewish thinkers of the beginning of 
the twentieth century. Then we will analyze how their work affected the interpretation 
of messianism in Derrida, who developed his concept in conversation with Walter 
Benjamin and Emmanuel Lévinas. The central part of the article will study in great 
detail the peculiarities of the Derrida’s interpretation of messianicity as a primordial 
structure of experiencing an openness to the coming of the others when we are unable 
to foresee their arrival. It is impossible to predict what is coming, or to become ready 
for it. It should be noted that Derrida’s idea of messianicity is strongly linked to his 
conceptualization of an alterity. It’s also worth noting that other is a key word in Jacques 
Derrida’s terminology. The concept of otherness is essential in all of his work, even 
when it is examined with varying methods. According to Derrida, this concept cannot 
be reduced to a simple linguistic formulation; every other is wholly other, and any idea 
of the other is open to paradoxes and aporias. However, close reading of Derrida’s 
work proves that he calls it “something that is completely other, something that cannot 
be returned to the same by any form of dialectical sublation” (Miller, 1996, p. 155). 
The Derridian concept of the other that implies absolute singularity of every being 
has essential consequences for moral obligations, political activities and religion. As 
we will demonstrate, Derrida’s notion of messianicity does not exclude the religious 
phenomena. We will conclude with an analysis of the full range of interpretations that 
Derrida’s concept of messianiсity has been received. While some researchers have 
interpreted it as a clear sign of the religious intentions of the late Derrida’s philosophy, 
others have maintained the atheistic nature of the concept, as simply deconstruction.
Appealing to philosophical thought when developing the theological concept 
of messianism is a recent phenomenon related to historical developments during 
the last two centuries. One of the main paradoxes of modern history is that the 
unprecedented growth of violence and the cruelty that characterizes it have been 
accompanied by a previously unknown revival of the concepts of hope and the 
future. The decisive role played in this process belongs to a number of prominent 
Jewish intellectuals who were active during the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Walter Benjamin, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch, Theodor Adorno, 
Gershom Scholem, among others). They all sought to clarify the nature of the 
relationship between European and Jewish culture, as well as find answers to 
current social and political challenges. As the French philosopher Pierre Bouretz 
(2003/2010) emphasized, their versions of the messianic utopia were developed as 
a faithful companion to twentieth-century suffering and terror, and at the same time 
as a form of protest against the concept of the irreversible progress of the world – 
that is, against the horrific excesses of immanence. By promoting the concept of 
being “witnesses of the future,” they rejected the idea of the past as completed and 
done with, they defied attempts to predict the blind future, and they encouraged 
resistance toward the view of man “having become purely a historical being” (Bouretz, 
2003/2010, p. 11). Their purpose was to remember the past and tradition while also 
developing a concept of time that retains full openness towards a future, which 
cannot be confined by any horizons of significance and expectation. Philosophical 
reflection on messianism continued during the second half of the last century. 
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Derrida’s Messianicity in the Context of Jewish Philosophical Messianism
It should be noted that while attention to ethical and religious issues is inherent to 
Derrida’s later work, the texts from his early years also address topics related to 
religion. Already in Glas (Derrida, 1974/1986), the question of religion is the focus of the 
philosopher’s attention in his reading of Hegel’s early texts. Between 1980 and 1990, 
Derrida turned to the analysis of negative theology and the problems of the translation 
of sacred texts, as well as to phenomena such as confession, faith, hospitality, and 
gifts. Works of this period call into question the established treatment of Derrida’s 
philosophy as promoting atheism and late period modern secularism. Is it possible 
to talk about the appeal to religion of a philosopher who has gone to so much effort to 
critique the metaphysics of presence, which is so important to religious discourse? 
According to Derrida, the fundamental feature of the history of western metaphysics 
is the modality of thinking about Being in terms of presence. Human thought and 
language always refer to something external, and the Being is an ultimate reference 
and “transcendental signified” of our discourses. As such, it provides a metaphysical 
justification of certainty of human knowledge. Derrida claims that metaphysics of 
presence is a profound mistake since it fails to recognize that human understanding 
of reality is linguistically mediated. His philosophical project intended to undermine 
the possibility of disregarding the linguistic mediation of reality by deconstructing 
the “transcendental signified.” At first glance, deconstruction is not favorable to 
religion. If the idea of God is regarded as the name of transcendental signified, then 
the classical theistic view of the omnipotent God as a ground of all meaning can be 
deconstructed as a merely human concept. However, as the reading of Derrida’s 
texts shows, he is not interested in returning to traditional theism. His purpose is 
much more radical, for he is convinced that the God of conventional theism has 
become a thing of the past. Derrida tries to think of God and faith after Enlightenment 
skepticism, the death of God, and the destruction of metaphysics.
“Messianicity” is one of the essential leitmotifs of the final decade of Derrida’s 
work. Philosopher explores traditional theological themes without reference to religion 
as an established system of dogmas, mode of social organization, or a foundation for 
the moral life. The methodology of Derrida’s employment of theological concepts is 
well illustrated by his reflections on the nature of religion in The Gift of Death (Derrida, 
1992/1996). The ambiguity of the issue of death is understood here as the context for 
analyzing the responsibility of free subjectivity, access to which is provided by religion. 
However, religion here doesn’t mean traditional denominational beliefs and practices, 
but what Derrida defines as “religion without religion,” that is, not classical theism or 
institutional patterns of religion, but a form of faith that does not require an event of 
revelation for its existence. 
Derrida addressed problems of messianism initially in the essay “Violence and 
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Lévinas” (Derrida, 1967/2001). 
Lévinas’ project was aimed to break with Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian 
ontology, which by attempting to possess and know the Other, concealed its infinite 
alterity and reduced it to the Same. Derrida offers an extensive critique of Lévinas’ 
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interpretation of Husserl and Heidegger and questions his explanation of the ethical 
relationship in a face-to-face encounter. He also analyzes Lévinas’ appeal to the 
tradition, which is beyond the bounds of the key concepts of Greek thought, namely 
to “messianic eschatology.” It is certainly not that Lévinas’ philosophy is based on 
the religious texts of Judaism or is a form of “Jewish theology” or “Jewish mysticism.” 
Moreover, the philosophy of Lévinas “can even be understood as the trial of theology 
and mysticism” (Derrida, 1967/2001, p. 103). In this sense, Derrida is close to Lévinas 
himself, who in Totality and Infinity denies the idea that eschatological theologies can 
supplement philosophical discourses through their prophetic proclamations of the 
ultimate purpose of being and through offering a clear picture of the future. In order for 
the “eschatology of messianic peace” to gain significance in philosophical thinking, it 
needs, according to Lévinas, a primordial and original relation with being, a “relation 
with being beyond the totality or beyond history” (Lévinas, 1961/2011, p. 22).
Derrida interprets this “beyond” as an appeal to experience itself, to practice, and 
to the irreducible alterity of the other. Therefore, owing to eschatology, which goes 
beyond all totality and objective experience and awakens people to the fullness of 
their responsibility, a figure of the other is discovered, which, according to Lévinas, 
cannot be understood within the framework of traditional philosophy, and which is the 
sole source of ethics. Thus, in one of his earliest texts, Derrida picks up on Lévinas’ 
idea of messianic eschatology and uses it to assess if Lévinas’ efforts to go beyond 
Greek philosophical tradition are productive.
It should be noted that despite the fact that for the first time Derrida addresses the 
subject of messianism under the influence of Lévinas, an even more important role in 
the development of his conception of the messianic was played by the philosophical 
legacy of Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), the author of one of the most influential 
versions of the philosophical understanding of messianism.
Written shortly before his tragic death in September 1940, Benjamin’s On the 
Concept of History (Benjamin, 1996) denies that historical progress will inevitably 
lead to the replacement of capitalism by socialism. Instead, the thinker underpins his 
own conception of historical time, the defining aspect of which is the idea of breaking, 
active messianic intervention in the course of events. Refusing to interpret the 
historical process as a homogeneous and linear “empty time,” Benjamin claims that 
every moment of the history is “the small gateway in time through which the Messiah 
might enter” (Benjamin, 1996, p. 397). For Benjamin, temporality of “a time to come” is 
not of future as coming present, “but that of the future anterior, a time in which future 
and past do not so much come together as come about one another, doing so in a 
way that circumvents conventional modalities of presence and holds time open to the 
coming of another (Levine, 2014, pp. 5–6).
The sudden arrival of the Messiah and the end of the history of the world – that 
is to say, large-scale historical transformations – can occur in an unprogrammed 
way, at any moment, even when their arrival is not expected. They are possible only 
as the radical interruption of linear time. Therefore, Benjamin is trying to defend the 
possibility of a revolutionary breakthrough in a situation where its occurrence is not 
conditioned by any socio-economic realities. Here we find an echo of the widespread 
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belief in Jewish mysticism that glimpses of future salvation can be found in the 
present. In this context, it should also be noted that the experience of the moment as 
a moment of the symbolic unity of the religious community and its intense expectation 
of salvation is also inherent in the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig. The author of The 
Star of Redemption (Rosenzweig, 1921/2005) emphasizes that the community must 
be in a state of intense expectation that the Kingdom of God is about to come. This 
experience of maximum intensity reveals an important paradox: the balance between 
the concentration of history in one moment interacts with a permanent delay, shifting 
the finale of history into the future. A critical moment of world history is approached 
by people who “have been endowed with a weak messianic power, a power on which 
the past has a claim” (Benjamin, 1996, p. 390) – people who seek justice for the dead, 
forgotten in the whirlwind of historical cataclysms. They do not cherish the vain illusion 
that a happy future is coming as a result of rampant scientific and technological 
progress but retain the memory of a “secret agreement between past generations” 
who seemingly expected that new generations will set them free from stories written 
by the victors.
The question of the degree of influence of Benjamin’s “weak messianic power” on 
Derrida’s “messianicity” remains debatable. At first glance, the approaches of the two 
philosophers are close enough, since both appeal to Marxism and employ the notion 
of messianism. What is common to Benjamin and Derrida is “a certain messianic 
weakening,” or the refusal to give some specific content to the messianic promise 
or to determine the form of the messianic event. On this basis, John D. Caputo even 
argues that Benjamin’s “weak messianic power” and Derrida’s “messianicity” are 
expressions of the same idea (Caputo, 1997, p. 352). However, commenting on 
Benjamin’s statement about weak messianism in Specters of Marx (Derrida, 2006), 
Derrida argues that the logic of his messianic thought is “turned toward the future no 
less than the past, in a heterogeneous and disjointed time” (Derrida, 2006, p. 228). 
Thus, while Benjamin’s weak messianism contains a strong ethical impulse, calling for 
remembering the forgotten victims of history (or those who are at risk of oblivion), his 
appeal to the past carries with it the risk of losing focus on the future – that is, giving 
attention to what is always yet to come. History could be addressed with the critical 
selection of the heritage we want to bring to the future. The work of mourning is not a 
one-time task that can be accomplished and completed, but is rather an indication of 
an important way of being human. At the core, the formation of subjectivity takes place 
in the process of mourning, inheriting what is passed on from previous generations 
and developing an awareness of one’s duty toward them. We are not able to bring the 
dead back to life, but we are capable of witness and sorrow. It is impossible to establish 
justice and prevent the recurrence of wrongs from the past simply by “burying” the 
past. Instead, one should constantly practice the “work of mourning” with its continued 
attention to the past for the sake of preserving the messianic hope for the future.
Thus, the decisive difference between Derrida’s messianism and Benjamin’s 
weak messianic power lies in the various “logics of inheritance.” For Benjamin, it is 
important to preserve the totality of the past in order to perpetuate the memory of 
the forgotten victims of coercion and injustice, as well as to open up the possibility of 
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reawakening the past in an era of revolutionary catastrophes that threaten to forget 
about the suppressed. According to Derrida, the duty toward the past consists not 
so much in preserving a certain tradition, but in remembering the past for the sake of 
repeating and confirming the difference of the other.
Mourning over difference requires a kind of “exorcism,” but not in order “to chase 
away the ghosts, but this time to grant them the right, if it means making them come 
back alive as revenants who would no longer be revenants, but as other arrivants to 
whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer welcome – without certainty, ever, 
that they present themselves as such” (Derrida, 2006, p. 220). Although inheritance 
confirms the return of the past, this past, paradoxically, is a time yet to come, a time 
that is fundamentally different from any other period in history that we know of. The 
task, therefore, is to open the past for the future, to leave in it the cracks through 
which newness can enter, to provide an opportunity for the disruption of the usual 
course of things.
Messianicity as Openness to the Arrival of an Unpredictable Other
Messianicity appears as a sign of the openness towards the future that is fundamentally 
unpredictable. This radical openness to the possibilities of the forthcoming offers a 
hope for coming of justice. Undoubtedly, openness is never absolute – at every step 
forward something from the past is lost, and every moment of inheritance opens new 
possibilities for transformation and the multiplication of tradition. The driving force 
and at the same time the vulnerability of the gesture of inheritance Derrida exposes 
in the concept of promise. According to the general structure of promise, the future 
(that is, not the future in conventional sense of the word, but the radical future – what 
Derrida calls l’avenir) always exceeds any prediction or calculation. Derrida denies 
an understanding of time as a sequence of modalized presents – the past is not the 
present that is past, and the present is not a mere result of the past. For this reason, 
the future cannot be regarded as a projected continuation of the present. It is not a 
descriptive empirical future, but a messianic eschatological future, an expectation of 
the arrival of an unpredictable other, in which our “come” is turned to the point that we 
cannot determine, predict, or calculate in advance who or what is coming.
Messianicity calls for inheriting those texts of the past that are most open to 
the future. This approach is exemplified by Derrida’s interaction with the legacy of 
Marxism, in which he sees the most striking modern manifestation of messianic 
hospitality, “certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience 
of the promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any 
metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism” (Derrida, 2006, p. 111).
As Derrida explains in his important essay Faith and Knowledge: The Two 
Sources of Faith and Knowledge at the Limits of Reason Alone (Derrida, 1996/2002), 
messianicity is depicted not as a religious phenomenon, but as the primordial general 
structure of experiencing an openness to the forthcoming (l’avenir) beyond any horizon 
of expectations defined by religious conceptual schemes. This messianic dimension 
does not depend on any messianism; it does not come from a definite revelation of 
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the Abrahamic religion. Its essence consists in “movement of an experience open 
to the absolute future of what is coming, that is to say, a necessarily indeterminate, 
abstract, desert-like experience that is confided, exposed, given up to its waiting for 
the other and for the event” (Derrida, 2006, p. 112). In contrast, religious and political 
messianisms form in advance a set of expectations and prophetic predictions that 
determine how, where, when, and under what conditions the other may appear. 
Because messianisms contain a predetermined horizon of expectation, they inevitably 
commit violence towards unique singularities. 
Thus, it is anticipated that we will extend radical hospitality to the arrivant 
without imposing on him any prior obligations or conditions. Derrida defines it as “a 
waiting without horizon of expectation,” that is, “awaiting what one does not expect 
yet or any longer, hospitality without reserve, welcoming salutation accorded in 
advance to the absolute surprise of the arrivant from whom or from which one will 
not ask anything in return” (Derrida, 2006, p. 211). An example of this register of an 
appeal to the present to go beyond itself is Derrida’s interpretation of a “democracy-to-
come,” which means not a specific form of government but something fundamentally 
different, something that still has to come, going beyond the previously known. The 
effectiveness of a democratic promise is linked to the eschatological expectation 
of some unpredictable alternativeness. It cannot be identified with any particular 
embodiment of democracy but calls for the endless transformation of the societies 
that exist here and now.
In explaining the meaning of the messianic, Derrida repeatedly uses the famous 
Aggada of the Babylonian Talmud. He appeals to this story, influenced by the earlier 
interpretations of Blanchot (1980, pp. 214–215). Aggada begins with Rabbi Joshua 
ben Levi meeting the prophet Elijah and asking him when the Messiah will come. 
The prophet replies that the rabbi can ask this question directly of the Messiah, for 
he is sitting at the gates of Rome dressed in rags. When the rabbi reaches Rome 
and indeed meets the Messiah in the company of the poor at the gates of Rome, he 
asks him, “When will you come?” and the Messiah answers, “Now.” Derrida notes a 
discrepancy, an inadequacy between the generalized and specific “now” in this story. 
In the same way that the Messiah is not waiting and is coming right now, we should 
anticipate the coming of the future right at this moment in time. The Messiah is not 
some future present; his coming is here and it is inevitable. The parable points to the 
messianic structure as responsibility, for the coming of the event. At the same time, 
Derrida notes the “ambiguity” of the messianic structure: we can expect the arrival 
of the other, hoping in reality that he will not come, that the arrival of the Messiah will 
remain in permanent delay. Derrida points out that “we wait for something we would 
not like to wait for” (Derrida, 1997, p. 24), or as John D. Caputo explains, “The Messiah 
must always be to come. The Messiah is a very special promise, namely, a promise 
that would be broken were it kept, whose possibility is sustained by its impossibility” 
(Caputo, 1997, p. 162).
Although Derrida calls for a careful delineation of the notions of messianism 
and messianicity, he still leaves the question of the connection between them open. 
Religious and political messianisms always annunciate the arrival of a clearly defined 
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messiah at a certain time and place. When the Messiah actually comes, as soon as 
the future really becomes a definite presence, the messianic will immediately cease 
to exist, because its essence lies in the expectation of what is yet to come. The 
proclamation of the arrival of the Messiah will pave the way for the other whose 
messianic experience is different from your messianism. Derrida’s Messiah is 
the one we hope to come to, even though we know he will never come. This is an 
impossible opportunity of the future. The impossible goes beyond the possible, not 
as its direct opposite, but as the desire to overcome what is obviously predictable. 
The coming of the Messiah, his full presence, would deny any messianic expectation. 
By pointing to a particular Messiah, confessional messianism defines the future and 
limits it to the scope of specific messianic determination. Justice and expectations 
become related to counting, program, conformity, and predictable outcomes.
Idea of Messianicity and Religious Messianisms
Derrida emphasizes that although his idea of messianicity is not related to what 
is considered to be the essence of religious messianisms, that is, the historical 
revelation and figure of the Messiah, it does not mean that they should be dismissed 
as absurd eschatological fabrications. He refuses to identify messianicity with 
messianism, since the latter is always associated with a particular religion, limited 
by a specific cultural environment and a dogmatic system of beliefs. Derrida’s 
secularized messianicity retains its separation from specific socio-cultural and 
religious contexts, allowing it to be a truly universal category. At the same time, as 
the most general structure of experience, messianicity does not exclude religious 
manifestations of messianism. At a roundtable at Villanova University (1997), Derrida 
explained his position in more detail.
When I insisted in Specters of Marx on messianicity, which I distinguished 
from messianism, I wanted to show that the messianic structure is a universal 
structure. As soon as you address the other, as soon as you are open to the 
future, as soon as you have a temporal experience of waiting for the future, of 
waiting for someone to come: that is the opening of experience. Someone is to 
come, is now to come. Justice and peace will have to do with this coming of the 
other, with the promise. Each time I open my mouth, I am promising something. 
When I speak to you, I am telling you that I promise to tell you something, to tell 
you the truth. Even if I lie, the condition of my lie is that I promise to tell you the 
truth. So the promise is not just one speech act among others; every speech 
act is fundamentally a promise. This universal structure of the promise, of the 
expectation for the future, for the coming, and the fact that this expectation of the 
coming has to do with justice – that is what I call the messianic structure. This 
messianic structure is not limited to what one calls messianisms, that is, Jewish, 
Christian, or Islamic messianism, to these determinate figures and forms of the 
Messiah. As soon as you reduce the messianic structure to messianism, then 
you are reducing the universality and this has important political consequences. 
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Then you are accrediting one tradition among others and a notion of an elected 
people, of a given literal language, a given fundamentalism. That is why I think 
that the difference, however subtle it may appear, between the messianic and 
messianism is very important (Derrida, 1997, p. 23).
Having stressed the necessity to maintain a distinction between the concepts 
of messianism and messianicity, Derrida still hesitates about the true nature of 
their relationship, considering two possible hypotheses in Faith and Knowledge. 
According to the first one, messianicity is the most basic structure of experience, 
which has particular representations in historical messianisms. In this case, 
messianicity should be viewed on the same basis as the general structure of the 
Offenbarkeit (Revealability) developed by Heidegger in The Question of Being 
(Heidegger, 1957/1958), in order to clarify specific ways of Being’s revealing itself 
and to evaluate their authenticity. Religions are then only concrete examples of the 
universal structure of messianicity, and its study later involves first of all research 
into the fundamental ontological conditions of the possibility of religion. At the same 
time, Derrida suggests another hypothesis, according to which the Offenbarung 
(Revelation) of Abrahamic religious traditions were absolute, unique events, through 
which universal possibilities of messianicity have shown themselves. Derrida does 
not give a definitive answer as to which of these hypotheses is more likely; he would 
like to find an explanation that combines both. The philosopher points out that, 
although his notion of messianiсity is significantly different from that of Judaism, 
Christianity, or Islam, it still depends on these singular events of revelation.
Interpretations of Derrida’s Messianicity
Derrida’s concept of messianiсity has a wide range of interpretations. While some 
researchers have assessed it as clear confirmation of the religious intentions of the 
late Derrida’s thought, others have insisted on the atheistic nature of the concept, as 
all deconstruction. The atheistic reading of Derrida was supported by the Swedish 
philosopher Martin Hägglund. In his view, widespread theological interpretations of 
Derrida’s thought are inconsistent. The trajectory of deconstruction fits in completely 
with the logic of radical atheism, which not only denies the existence of God and 
immortality, as does traditional atheism, but also denies the very possibility of a 
person’s desire for God and immortality. In the seeming pursuit of infinite being 
and fullness, Hägglund sees a desire to survive, to increase life expectancy that 
is determined by an openness to the unpredictable future that can either enrich or 
destroy us. “I argue that the so-called desire for immortality dissimulates a desire for 
survival that precedes it and contradicts it from within” (Hägglund, 2008, p. 1). 
Hägglund also sees radical atheism in Derrida’s concept of messianicity. 
Although this concept, more than any other, led to the suspicion that the philosopher 
secretly cherished the religious hope for salvation, according to Hägglund, such 
readings of Derrida’s thought are based on confusion of the notions of messianicity 
and concrete religious forms of “messianism”. In Derrida’s vocabulary, messianicity 
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is just another name for the undecidable future, which creates a chance for the 
desirable, but at the same time threatens it from within. At the same time, traditional 
messianism is a religious or political belief in the future that will put an end to time, 
replacing it with an eternal tranquility that cannot be destroyed. The only common 
feature of messianicity and religious messianism is the formal structure of the 
promise of the coming, by which Derrida reads messianism against itself. Thus, 
Hägglund concludes that Derrida is inverting the logic of religious eschatology. 
Derrida emphasizes that the coming of the other does not contribute to the end of 
time, but always exceeds any definite end of life or history. His version of eschatology 
proclaims not the end of time, but only absolute openness to the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the future. In addition, messianic hospitality for the future is not 
connected to the promise of peace. The arrivant may not be the bearer of peace, 
the Messiah, but as Derrida recognizes, the wrongdoer, the bearer of hatred, evil, 
and violence.
John D. Caputo, an American philosopher and one of the influential proponents 
of the use of deconstruction in religious thinking, disagrees with such a reading 
of Derrida1. In his interpretation, the concept of messianicity refers to the core of 
Derrida’s special religion, “of the call for a justice, a democracy, a just one to come, 
a call for peace among the concrete messianisms” (Caputo, 1997, p. xxviii). The 
difference between messianicity and messianism is interpreted as the difference 
between peace and war. The messianism of concrete, historical religions is always 
a source of exclusivism and violence, while the true meaning of messianicty lies 
in the promise of divine peace and the Kingdom of God accessible to all. Treating 
a specific religious tradition as the possessor of higher knowledge, granted 
only to God’s chosen people, is a formula for endless war. For instance, Derrida 
viewed the conflict in the Middle East as a merciless war of dangerous “messianic 
eschatologies”, driven by the desire to prove the truth of a particular version of 
messianism. Therefore, as opposed to confessional messianism, Caputo draws 
attention to the proclamations of the biblical prophets, who reminded their readers 
that God is seeking not ritual sacrifices, but justice for all oppressed people. In this 
approach, deconstruction is seen as the salvation of religion, because it cleanses it 
of its worst instincts.
Responding to Hägglund’s reading of Derrida in an atheistic perspective, Caputo 
argues that the Swedish philosopher misunderstood the deconstructionist’s interest 
in religion as an effort to protect common religious beliefs and denominational 
tenets. Relying on Derrida’s distinction between faith and religion, Caputo defines 
the purpose of deconstructing religion in its reimagining as “religion without religion”, 
that is, more primordial faith (foi), quasi-transcendent for both theism and atheism, 
which are just different forms of dogmatic beliefs (croyances). This faith does not 
1 For instance, see Derrida, J., & Caputo, J. D. (1997). Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation 
with Jacques Derrida. New York, NY: Fordham University Press; Caputo, J. D. (1997). The Prayers and Tears 
of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press; 
Caputo, J. D., Dooley, M., & Scanlon, M. J. (Eds.). (2001). Questioning God. Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
IN: Indiana University Press); Caputo, J. D., & Scanlon, M. J. (Eds.). (2005). Augustine and Postmodernism: 
Confessions and Circumfession. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
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exist in a state of unbroken peace; it is not protected from doubts, error, evil, violence, 
or death. Rising from the abyss of unbelief, this “unprotected religion” is more open 
to uncertainty and structural risk. As Caputo points out that in his analysis, Hägglund 
relies on a truncated, caricatured version of deconstruction when he claims that it 
is the decisive refutation of religion and that “deconstruction proceeds on a level of 
neutral, value-free descriptive analysis of the logic of time” (Caputo, 2015, p. 155). 
In fact, however, deconstruction is not about destroying religion by means of radical 
atheism; rather, it is a way of rereading and rethinking religion.
Caputo’s views on deconstruction are largely shared by another influential 
continental philosopher of religion, Richard Kearney. Analyzing Derrida’s statement 
that the name of God, like any other name, should be considered in the context 
of radical atheism, Kearney concludes that Derrida’s purpose is not to abandon 
the phenomenon of God as such, but to sustain a general openness to difference 
without name, that is, without the identity of the historical givenness of the deity of 
historical religions (Kearney, 1999, p. 122). This general disposition to the arrival 
of the other, which is understood as the unpredictable occurrence of an event, is 
a messianicity that contradicts any form of the messianism of positive revelation. 
Therefore, according to Kearney, atheism for Derrida is not a total rejection of the 
idea of God, but rather a disagreement with the statement that a definite God is 
a condition for the possibility of God, who still has to come, to be named. While 
agreeing with Derrida’s call for unconditional openness to the arrival of the other, 
Kearney nevertheless critically appreciates the assertion that the arrivant may be 
anyone or anything. He hopes that deconstruction waits for the coming of justice 
and associates this coming with the notion of a transcendent God who comes to 
save and liberate.
However, for Kearney, the possibility of combining the coming of this good 
God with the radical unpredictability of the future remains extremely problematic. 
Caputo ignores this problem, agreeing with Derrida that justice is concerned with 
the other, whose arrival cannot be predicted, while at the same time emphasizing 
that the other is always a victim and not a wrongdoer. Given that, as Derrida points 
out, anyone who comes can change his or her name and become anyone at any time, 
in “Desire of God” (1999) Kearney asks how we can distinguish between “between 
true and false prophets, between bringers of good and bringers of evil, between holy 
spirits and unholy ones … between a living God and a dead one, between Elijah 
and his ‘phantom’, between messiahs and monsters” (Kearney, 1999, p. 127). Such 
a distinction is possible only if there are clear criteria. Without giving them, Derrida 
underestimates “the need for some kind of critical discernment based on informed 
judgment, hermeneutic memory, narrative imagination, and rational discrimination” 
(Kearney, 1999, p. 139).
However, it should be noted that Derrida’s refusal to articulate a specific set of 
criteria does not mean that he underestimates the importance of identification and 
differentiation. On the contrary, Derrida argues that such acts are necessary because 
of the unpredictability of the future. We have to identify and make decisions each time 
because we are not able to predict in advance how the other will act. Establishing clear 
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preliminary criteria for the arrival of the other, Derrida points out, would be an act of 
discrimination and a restriction of unconditional universal hospitality – openness to 
the newcomer, whoever he may be. Total security is possible only if the possibility of 
something unexpected is closed. The rejection of the threat of trauma associated with 
the arrival of an unpredictable other is possible only at the expense of the rejection of 
the opportunity for transformation.
Another line of criticism of the messianic tradition of Lévinas and Derrida relies 
on a renewed reading of the texts of the Apostle Paul. In particular, we would like 
to mention such philosophers as Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Giorgio Agamben. 
All of them, to one degree or another, accept Jacob Taubes’ confidence in the 
determining role of messianism in the theology of the Apostle Paul. They also share 
the conviction that messianism was an important structural factor in the history of 
Western thought, finding expression not only in the Judeo-Christian religious heritage 
but also in secular phenomena. The findings of these philosophers signal a break 
with the phenomenological tradition of interpreting messianism. In particular, Badiou 
deploys criticism of Lévinas’ ethic of alterity, which, in his belief, either falls into quasi-
theological piety that emphasizes the absolute otherness of God or reduces itself 
to a liberal assertion of difference and individuality. Badiou’s criticism of messianic 
ethics is based on a new reading of Pauline messianism. The Apostle’s faithfulness 
to the event of Christ’s resurrection serves as foundation for a new universal truth that 
eliminates the conflict between Jewish law and the Greek logos. If Badiou contrasts 
Lévinas’ messianic otherness with Paul’s messianic universality, Žižek calls into 
question Derrida’s messianic future, relying on the urgency of the messianic moment 
of the Apostle’s theology, his emphasis on the Messiah’s coming. The Apostle’s belief 
that the Messiah is here, according to Žižek, resists the Derridian existence in a state 
of uncertainty and constant delay, calling for life in the new space already opened by 
the Event of Christ (Žižek, 2003, pp. 136–137).
Conclusion
Summarizing the analysis of Derrida’s concept of messiancity, it should be noted that 
despite the criticism it has faced, the concept of “messianicity without messianism” 
has already became an influential concept in contemporary philosophy of religion. 
In the context of current civilizational challenges, it calls for openness to an absolute, 
unpredictable future and a respect for the other. In our view, Derrida’s philosophy 
of religion and his call for the deconstruction of traditional messianism should not 
be characterized as atheistic. Religious and political messianisms need constant 
deconstruction because, unlike abstract messianicity, they are incapable to respect 
the irreducibility of the other. However, their deconstruction is by no means an 
attempt to return to some sort of Enlightenment version of “religion within reason 
alone,” for, as Derrida points out, religion and science share a common source—the 
primordial faith that forms the basis for any social connection and communication. 
Therefore, the deconstruction of messianisms means releasing religions from their 
fundamentalist claims in order to promote their openness to the other.
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